AMERICAN PHENOMENOLOGICAL CRITICISM AND THE GENEVA SCHOOL

The most prestigious place in modern criticism has for a long time been assumed by a formal objective approach. Its disciples consider a work of art as an aesthetic object with objectively ascertainable forms, and their method has the advantage of being exclusively literary. But at the same time they tend to assume that it is the only approach to literature, and this affirmation is now being challenged by a new approach that “lays stress on the perceiver’s vital and central role in determining meaning” [The Penguin Dictionary 1999, p. 663].

The historical lines are now drawn between “objective” criticism and a European movement that analyzes the consciousness manifest in literature. This criticism of consciousness looks to the works of philosophers like Kierkegaard and Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. The criticism of consciousness or criticism of experience has developed in complete opposition to the familiar analytical, logical-positivist attitude. It has different historical roots and responds to different intellectual needs.

Arising out of existential speculation during and after World War II, it reflects the crumbling of prewar paper moralities and the desire for a newly vital philosophy of human experience. The names that represent the criticism of consciousness in European literature are as follows: Marcel Raymond, Albert Beguin, Georges Poulet, Jean-Pierre Richard, Jean Starobinski, Jean Rousset and Maurice Blanchot. These writers share the existential view of literature as a mental act. They have been called the new “Geneva School” or the “genetic” critics. They analyze the human consciousness in literature at its very focal point or genesis. As practical critics, they try to coexist with a creative consciousness at the moment when experience ceases to be mute and takes on the appearance of words and the structure of words.

The Geneva criticism stems from Marcel Raymond’s De Baudelaire au surrealisme and Albert Beguin’s L’Ame Romantique et le reve, both of which direct criticism toward analysis of feeling and imagination rather than toward verbal precision. Both propose new horizons for literary speculation. Georges Poulet, in particular, recognizes the determining influence of Raymond and Beguin upon his own works and method, although he broadens their approach to include more technical and philosophical ideas. Associated with Poulet are Jean-Pierre Richard, Jean Starobinski, Jean Rousset, and in the United States Joseph
Hillis Miller. Each of them is a distinct theorist in his own right and demonstrates varying aspects of a centrally developing attitude toward literature as conscious experience.

The criticism of consciousness is a criticism of the author’s experience conveyed in a text, and of his active consciousness at the moment of creation. Poulet coins the term “critique de la conscience” in his preface to Richard’s *Litterature et Sensation* and shows that this consciousness takes many forms in literature. It is the consciousness of individual subjective perception, or of an all-encompassing general existence, and exists in a special mental region of “interior distance”. In this inner space the author meditates on the distance between words and objects and between human thought and the expression it finally reaches. This consciousness is pure human perception, but its colouring may differ from subject to subject.

The idea of literary consciousness leads to an analysis of the work as a mental universe, a self-contained world where human experience takes shape as literature. In addition, the text’s “experience” may focus inward or outward.

Literature, for the Geneva critics, is a difficult but possible representation of reality. They try to discover “authentic” or “profound” expression in baroque, Romantic, and modern literature. They are concerned with authors, who seize reality in a new and virgin state and who express it in authentic, unintellectualized forms of language. The Geneva critics view “authentic expression” as a struggle carried on in the mind’s interior spaces, and as a mental discipline which seeks to comprehend experience by framing it in language. This creation in mental space attempts to fuse human perceptions of subject and object, and is thus an “experience” of life and an “act” of consciousness. The criticism aimed at this consciousness “sees literature as an act or genesis and analyzes it as a drama taking place in the mind” [Lawall 1968, p. 6].

The reader as a perceiver also gets into the focus of attention of the critics. In order to penetrate the conscious act, the reader must develop a systematically empathetic approach in which he tries to re-create the experience embodied in the text. He must subordinate his own subjective personality to a new subjective identity which is gradually created and revealed in the course of the book. Because the text had its genesis in the existential space of the mind, the reader is expected to place himself within the same confines and the same experience and to accept as orienting indications the book’s attitudes and expressions.

This empathetic reading is evidently not aimed at a formal analysis of the text. It views literature as an existential experience and act of cognition, and consequently attributes to the reader the task of extracting the work’s original creative experience. The reader cannot view the text “from outside”, in an aesthetic, formal or evaluative judgement, for he should attempt to coincide with
its very being and identity. Such an identity is neither formal nor biographical: the “author” is a literary, created “existent” visible only in the evidence of the text.

The consciousness perceived in an empathetic reading need not fit into a biographical formula. Although the Geneva critics tend to personify literary identities, Blanchot maintains a predictably impersonal approach. The Geneva critics assume that there are real perceptions and communicable experience: their analyses draw upon the entire body of an author’s work and treat separate texts as so many individual manifestations of the same developing personality. They define a work as the expression of an individual personality so their reading is openly personal. It is aimed at an available personal experience which symbolizes and makes possible communion among men.

The Geneva perspective forms a definite historical pattern of discovery and related theories from Raymond to Poulet and J.Hillis Miller. Raymond and Beguin are the historical forerunners of this theory, but they show it emerging from traditional ways of thought rather than give a coherent philosophy of literary existentialism. It is with Georges Poulet that this perspective takes on its full philosophical significance and influences the work of Richard, Starobinski, Rousset and Miller. These four Geneva critics have created their own critiques, developing a particular aspect of the criticism of consciousness. Within this group, Richard and Starobinski emphasize the perceptions and development of the incarnate “author”, while Rousset and Miller are mainly concerned with his formal incarnation. All agree that the act of creating literature is confined to a special realm of the mind: the interior distance of human perceptions, where alone exists any experience of reality.

Both Richard and Starobinski are close to Poulet in that both examine a literary being (or “incarnate” author) who surpasses the text. Richard tends to explain a work as a spiritual career, the development of an author’s integrated sensuous experience. His concept of “interior distance” emphasizes the interior impact of man’s exterior surroundings. Starobinski discusses the same existential integration on a more interior plane. He examines the author’s mental organization and subjective feelings. Starobinski’s criticism is guided by a metaphor of vision, a “look” that perceives on one level the author’s attitude toward himself and others, on another level his perception of structures of attitudes, and on a third level the author’s development of these perceptions into a coherent mental perspective. Richard and Starobinski both describe literary beings who organize their perceptions into individual forms of consciousness.

Rousset and Miller give more attention to the formal existence of literature, although Miller’s definition of form is more technical and Rousset’s is more existential. Rousset considers a preverbal “form” to which “themes” and
“structures” correspond. The composition of a work, in his view, involves interrelationships of words, images and characters that symbolize parallel relationships of sensations in the author’s mind. Rousset also studies the various forms in which man has expressed himself, and then deduces the attitude of an age by interpreting its prevailing literary images. He emphasizes form, for example, in his studies of baroque literature and in the analogies he draws with baroque art. Such an approach lends itself to existential histories of literature, and thus falls directly within the tradition of Raymond and Poulet.

Miller, however, works more closely with the form of the written text. He is more concerned with separate authors than with a history of human consciousness, although he firmly relates his authors to a background of historical consciousness. Miller looks upon an author’s work as an autonomous creation that expresses, in terms that can be formally analyzed, a personal adventure and incomparable universe. This critic, perhaps because of his American background, uses existential perspectives to guide a method which is more technical than that of the other critics in the Geneva School.

J. Hillis Miller, Professor of English at the Johns Hopkins University, openly made an attempt to transfer the methods of the Geneva School to the study of English literature. He combined the formal with the existential approach in his textual criticism of consciousness. He is the author of three books of criticism: Charles Dickens: the World of His Novels (1959), which is dedicated to Georges Poulet; The Disappearance of God (1963); and Poets of Reality (1965). In all three books, Miller moves alternately from an examination of metaphysical qualities to an analysis of the formal qualities that embody them. He tends to reveal the central nature of each author on various interrelated levels. Such an approach, he believes, can hope for a comprehensive, varied and coordinate reading.

Because he writes for an audience trained in the English critical tradition, and is himself educated in this tradition, Miller wants to avoid a misunderstanding between phenomenological and formal readings.

He does not abandon his primary concern with literary experience, but he is careful to assert that this experience, if it is to be a valid subject of analysis, must first appear in words. “A poem or novel is indeed the world refashioned into conformity with the inner structure of the writer’s spirit, but at the same time it is that spirit given, through words, a form and substance taken from the shared solidity of the exterior world. It is in this sense that the words of the work are themselves the primary datum, a self-sufficient reality beyond which the critic need not go.” [Miller 1959, p. X]. Individual words, however, do not provide Miller’s only data, and his interpretation goes farther than Poulet’s early technique of extrapolation. His analysis is not limited to an author’s direct
personal expression, for he discusses sentences, paragraphs and even a character's imagining mind as contained within its own universe. "This study presupposes that each sentence or paragraph of a novel, whether it is presented from the point of view of the narrator or of some imagined character, defines a certain relationship between an imagining mind and its object...the definition of a certain relation between the mind and its world" [Miller 1959, p. IX]. His emphasis on style, as Miller himself recognizes, brings him closer than other Geneva critics to American "new criticism". Miller remains the most style-conscious of the Geneva critics, but his definition of style is consistently phenomenological. Style is a "way of living in the world given a verbal form" [Miller 1959, p. X].

Dickens, says Miller, uses his characters to project the experiences of his own personal development. He examines himself through his characters, and creates their lives as so many vicarious attempts to achieve ontological integrity. Their grotesquerie, struggles, successes, and rebuffs represent stages in a master plan of existential inquiry that is not resolved until the final books. The experiences of the characters, their various false conclusions and new beginnings are all a part of their author's personal drama.

The pattern of this drama emerges from the sequence of experiences in the novels. The ending of Oliver Twist is a resolution which is essentially based on self-deception and it finds a "radical criticism" in The Old Curiosity Shop and Nicholas Nickleby. The "solution" of David Copperfield undergoes further examination in Bleak House and meets another "radical revaluation" in Great Expectations. Throughout, the problem facing all characters is one of reaching an authentic self that is related to outer reality but not subjected to it.

Martin Chuzzlewit embodies a stage in which Dickens investigates the possibility of a human contact "which would guarantee the uniqueness of each person...enhancing rather than absorbing and destroying his intrinsic identity" [Miller 1959, p. 97]. Finally, Dickens comes to a vision of self-creation which satisfies his needs. "To take responsibility for arranging the world is to take responsibility for making the self and to escape at last from the grim alternatives of guilty action, passivity or isolation which are initially the sole possibilities in the imaginative universe of Dickens." [Miller 1959, p. 334]. This passage describes a personal "authenticity" stemming from the choice and assertion of characterizing the vision of such authenticity culminates Dickens' search, throughout his novels, for ontological integrity.

Miller's next two books place several analyses in the framework of a larger historical context. They can be called chapters for Poulet's "history of the human consciousness". Each author has a separate "structure of consciousness", and reveals an "organizing form which presides over the elaboration" of his works. These structures form mental landscapes or "inscapes" (Miller adopts Hopkins'
term) that can be compared and the comparison of inscapes among authors is the first step in framing a literary history of the human consciousness.

Miller’s history, like Poulet’s, is related to a religious perspective. This perspective is part of the typical Geneva creative theory, but also reflects Miller’s particular touchstone for analyzing literary experience. In The Disappearance of God Miller chooses to emphasize theological experience because it “is most important and determines everything else” [Miller 1963, p. VIII] for the writers involved. The procedure is the same in Poets of Reality, although the latter writers have various initial experiences and reach more advanced conclusions. Miller uses the Genevan methodological approach with its ideal of a coherent pattern of existence, to reject an age-old philosophy of causation and logical sequence. He dislikes this philosophy because it has fragmented existence into terms of subject, object and being.

In The Disappearance of God Miller discusses five writers who try to overcome their inability to experience God. The first of these is Thomas De Quincey, the nineteenth century English author best known for his Confessions of an Opium Eater. Throughout his life, De Quincey yearns to recover the paradisical happiness of his childhood. On the death of his sister, he feels shut out from affection and security; he becomes a wanderer in a strange world. Through opium he glimpses a Godlike perspective which, if re-created in literature, would give him the coherent universe for which he longs. Miller maintains that De Quincey’s literary ideals of musical balance and continuity, his “literature of power” are no more than technical attempts to occupy mental space with a self-sustaining architecture. De Quincey fails because he uncovers only “an infinite abyss which can never be crossed or filled” [Miller 1963, p. 58]; he finds himself condemned to relive again and again his experience of loss. At the very end he accepts this tragic repetition as the way to God and discovers that man’s sense of separation is “his way of holding communion with God” [Miller 1963, p. 78].

Robert Browning’s experience is more concrete than De Quincey’s: he attempts to identify himself with God by creating a many-faceted world out of chaos. The attempt to experience God through various perspectives on reality fails; the poet is left in a “precarious equilibrium” between two extremes. This equilibrium functions in an intermediate “realm of imperfection and change” [Miller 1963, p. 140], where the poet is as close as possible to God and yet eternally removed. Browning’s language, “thick and substantial” with sounds, images and rhythms, helps to authenticate various poetic expressions of reality. When speaking of the poet’s language, Miller moves from the broad phenomenological reading to a smaller, more technical circle of formal analysis and so relates formal methods to phenomenological ends. Miller’s analytical
training focuses attention on the way in which formal effects suggest qualities that are not formal but physical or emotional. He moves from a larger to a smaller "circle" of reading but consistently directs his observations to the larger goal of phenomenological analysis.

Miller's *Poets of Reality* completes the spiritual history of literature begun in *The Disappearance of God*. He describes those stages of ontological insight that bring the 20th century past the 19th. He approaches literature through the "particular worlds" of his writers but he examines through these worlds the hypothesis that "a new kind of poetry has appeared in our day, a poetry which has grown out of romanticism but goes beyond it." [Miller 1965, p. 1]. In the 20th century God does not exist. Such is the starting point for the modern "poets of reality" who have to create a sense of coherent existence beyond the nihilism of subjective consciousness.

The outlines of this history have been given in Poulet's work but Miller is not merely a disciple of the French critic. He combines Poulet's phenomenological approach with its apparent opposite, the formal perspective. As a critic educated in the English tradition and as one who wishes to adapt the phenomenological view for English literature, he tries to synthesize both approaches. He upholds a comprehensive, alternating reading which moves from level to level of interpretation from circle to concentric circle. Miller recognizes that there may be several interrelated manners of reading, and practices a wide synthetic analysis. He, more than Poulet, tends to venture into the formal circle and to emphasize the effect of a writer's life position on his poetic technique. Where Poulet collates phenomenological literary perceptions to write a history of consciousness in literature, Miller never abandons the study of style in various circles of interpretation.

It is this ability to balance both the formal and the phenomenological perspectives and to make some sense between them that makes Miller the most useful of the critics of consciousness in terms of traditional literary interpretation. By discussing grammar, images, rhythm, onomatopoeia, and other technical devices, he has given the uncommitted reader a chance to follow a "reading of consciousness" through techniques that are public and objective.

By attempting to suspend moral, ideological or psychological assumptions, a phenomenological interpretation of literature hopes to reach "the things themselves", the essential phenomena of being, space and time, as they are constituted by consciousness, in words. The book by David Halliburton *Edgar Allan Poe. A Phenomenological View* is the first general study of an American author from this particular point of view. The critic is concerned with the reading of texts, what that reading reveals or fails to reveal. The book begins with a methodological chapter which sets out the assumptions and procedures of the
approach. The author hopes that in this way the reader can become acquainted with an interpretative method that remains unfamiliar to many.

When Santayana observed that “each sort of net drawn through the same sea catches a different sort of fish” [Santayana 1968, p. 40], he was suggesting that every method of interpretation has its peculiar assumptions. One of the peculiar assumptions of current criticism is that the literary work is a discrete object, a kind of inert and neutral “thing”, which we can study exactly as we would study any other object in the world. The phenomenologist holds a different view. Without denying that the work has, in some sense, a life of its own, the phenomenologist believes that the work cannot be cut off from the intentionality that experiences it after it is made. The work arises from some act of consciousness and is interpreted by some act of consciousness. Writing might be described as an act “in which a subjectivity passes into an objectivity without surrendering its own identity” [Halliburton 1973, p. 22]. The final product of the creative act is, then, a fusion in which both elements, the subjective and the objective, merge. An interpreter who attempts to construe the meaning of a text without regard to its intentional aspects limits himself. In doing this he denies the subjective, intentional element in himself, surrendering his most natural means of access to the text. The phenomenologist acknowledges this means and uses it, believing as he does that he can best approach a work through the capacities that he shares with its creator.

The critic acknowledges the role of Russian formalism in studying literary texts. The phenomenologist tries, with the Russian Formalists, to meet the text, and to stick with it. This involves a willingness to put aside considerations of value, personal taste or ideology. The intentionality in the work differs from other kinds of intentionality. There is “pure” intentionality sought after by Husserl. There is the aggregate of intentional acts that occur during the course of composition. And finally there is the intentionality expressed in the work. The phenomenological interpreter draws extensively on the theoretical foundations provided by Husserl, but endeavors to go beyond them by showing, as Husserl never chose to do, the complex role of intentionality in literary art. The interpreter does not explore the second type of intentionality simply because it is nowhere to be found. During the writing process the creating consciousness intends many things that never reach the stage of final expression. The totality of surviving intentions is the literary work; and it is with this that the interpreter is primarily concerned.

Halliburton’s chief concern is with the existential situation of the work – the way it stands against the horizon of interrelated phenomena that we call life. He is speaking of everyday things: of consciousness, identity, process, body, love, fear, struggle, the material world. All writing, all interpretation, all language
is a naming. When an interpreter names, he offers a creation in response to a creation offered him. It is only through critic’s making that he can approach the making of another. The critic makes an attempt to present to American reader some unfamiliar ideas derived from modern European philosophy and show how they work in literary criticism. Interpretation is being, and like “all other types of being, it has its peculiar responsibilities and privileges – not the least of which is the right to speak in its own authentic voice” [Halliburton 1973, p. 37].

**Literature**


*Santayana G.* The German Mind: A Philosophical Diagnosis. – New York, 1968.